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I. FOREWORD BY UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW PROFESSOR
JAN G. LAITos'

John Leshy's Carver Lecture is published in this issue of the Water
Law Review in an expanded form. The article is typical John Leshy
scholarship-insightful, thoughtful, provocative, and useful. What his
article on water rights for federal land conservation programs does not
convey is the role John Leshy played in the creation of these programs.
Therefore, a summary of the important position John Leshy held in
the history of the Department of the Interior of the United States
might be useful.
When Leshy became the Solicitor of the Interior Department in
1993, the Congress was split between Republicans and Democrats who
could not seem to agree on natural resources programs. By 1994,
when the Republicans gained control of the Congress, the United

t Professor of Law, Arizona State University (on leave); Solicitor, Department of the
Interior, 1993-2001; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Hastings College of the
Law, 2001-2002. This article is a somewhat edited version of the Carver Lecture I
delivered at the University of Denver, College of Law, on February 6, 2001. I
appreciate the helpful comments of Professors Joseph Sax, Janet C. Neuman, and
Michael C. Blumm on a draft version.
John CarverJr. Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources and Environmental
Law Program, University of Denver College of Law.
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States government was further split between a Democratic President
and a Republican House and Senate. The political situation remained
fractionated untilJohn Leshy left the federal government in 2001.
This political reality meant that, as a practical and realistic matter,
it would likely be impossible for Secretary of the Interior, Bruce
Babbitt, or his Solicitor, John Leshy, to have political initiatives
successfully run the gauntlet through Congress and become signed by
the President. New legislation would likely not be adopted during
Leshy's tenure as Solicitor.
In fact, even though much federal environmental and natural
resources legislation would have benefited from reauthorization by the
Congress, virtually none was during the eight years that Leshy was
Solicitor. The result was that not only did the Congress and the
President fail to amend or revise existing federal lands laws, but few
new laws involving public lands and resources received the blessings of
the Executive and Legislative branches between the years 1992 and
2000. This meant that if Babbitt and Leshy were to impose any policy
reform within the Interior Department, and on our public lands, they
would have to do so in a way that did not need the formal approval of
the Congress and the President.
And that is exactly what they did.
The real John Leshy legacy is that he and his boss, Bruce Babbitt,
were able to bring about somewhat of a revolution in public lands and
resources philosophy without the need of new or amended statutory
authorization. John Leshy became the master of using his office, and
the powers inherent in his office, to bring about change. He used
Opinions of the Solicitor, new rules adopted under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and administrative interpretations of existing laws to
ensure that many Leshy and Babbitt policies were implemented during
the eight years they served together in the Interior Department.
Again, this implementation of their policies did not require new
federal legislation. Although some may quarrel about the nature of, or
even the benefits associated with, these policies, they certainly seemed
consistent with the idea of conservation of scarce natural resources.
John Leshy's article on water rights for federal conservation
programs discusses a change that occurred while he was Solicitor, but
which, unlike some others, had the benefit of a specific congressional
authorization, in the form of Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve Act. The Great Sand Dunes, along with other public lands,
were set aside as a result of the far-thinking creativity of Leshy and
Babbitt. Moreover, most of these public lands have some semblance of
water that can be deployed to ensure their preservation long into the
future.
The United States should look back one day in wonder at how an
Interior Secretary and his Solicitor were able to bring about so many
changes in our public lands policies, almost single-handedly (and
certainly without explicit congressional approval). John Leshy showed
how it can be done, for better or worse, but certainly with his signature
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My topic is how to integrate the water requirements associated with
new federal land conservation initiatives-such as new national parks,
wildlife refuges, conservation areas, recreation areas, and wilderness
areas-with state water law systems. I am excluding any consideration
of Indian water rights, because while they are closely linked
conceptually with my topic, they are distinct enough-in contours,
history, and equity-to require separate thinking. I am also excluding
water needs to carry out federal regulatory programs such as the Clean
Water Act or the Endangered Species Act.
How the national government should secure water rights for its
federal land programs has been the subject of discussion for a long
time. Just one piece of this large puzzle, the extent to which
wilderness designations of federal land carry federal water rights with
them, has led to a vigorous debate, waged in and out of courts for
more than two decades. A lot of ink has been spilled on the subjectsome, I'll admit, by me'-yet the matter is still not finally settled. Just
last year, voters threw off the bench an Idaho Supreme Court Justice
after a spirited campaign in which the principal issue was the Justice's
opinion, and her deciding vote in a court split 3-2, in favor of a federal
reserved water right for national forest wilderness areas. After the
Justice's defeat at the polls, but before she left the bench, another
member of the court, the ChiefJustice, switched her vote in the matter
2
and the court reversed its decision.
This episode was a sobering reminder of how ajudiciary, subject to
popular vote, may feel the sting of the backlash from a single decision.
More pertinent to my topic here, it showed how much water rights
issues-particularly those involving the federal government-still
command great cultural and political value in the arid West. This was
not, after all, a death penalty or abortion or election law case which
1. See, e.g., 86 Interior Decision 553, 609-10 (1979) (co-author);JOSEPH L. SAXET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 809-10 (3d ed. 2000); John D. Leshy, Water
and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 389, 398-406 (1988).

2. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000); see also, Rocky
Barker, Water Ruling Reversed: Idaho High Court Decides Feds Don't Own Wilderness Flows
but Reserve Control of 'Wild and Scenic'Salmon, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 28, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 28731552.
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can train public attention on the judiciary anywhere. But it illustrates
what makes the disputatious West a lively venue for those of us
interested in water law.
Congress had made the wilderness designations at issue in the
Idaho case several decades ago, in 1964, 1978, and 1980. What I want
to focus on here is not what has been done on this subject in the past,
but on what Congress (or the executive, exercising power delegated to
it by the Congress) might do in the future when they consider, as they
surely will, setting aside more federal land for conservation purposes.
What should they say, if anything, about securing water rights needed
for such conservation set-asides from available, unappropriated water
supplies? These last four words are important to bear in mind: I will
assume throughout that water is available for these federal uses at the
time Congress makes the new conservation designations. If the
needed water is already subject to vested rights inconsistent with those
uses, the federal government can secure water rights for new federal
purposes only by purchase or donation.
BACKGROUND

Let me set the stage by first sketching out, in very broad strokes,
how we got to where we are. To water aficionados, the story is familiar.
Starting with the California Gold Rush in 1848, the issue of whether
federal or state law would be paramount in allocating and
administering water rights in the West was an abiding concern. Over
the next century and a half, the underlying tension between national
and state primacy was resolved by a series of expansions and
contractions of state primacy. Those accordion-like movements took
place every generation or so.
At first, the federal government basically got out of the way. The
states and territories seized the initiative (or, more accurately, rushed
into the vacuum left by federal inaction) to develop local laws and
customs. The states mostly followed principles of prior appropriation,
and applied these principles on, as well as off, federal lands. After
almost two decades of silence, the federal government formally
stepped aside in the Mining Acts of 1866' and 1870,' and the Desert
Land Act of 1877,' deferring to local laws and customs to govern
private parties' appropriation of water on federal lands. This made
sense at the time, because the federal government wasn't really
thinking about conserving land for national purposes, with one
notable exception: Yellowstone.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the national
3. Act ofJuly 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253. See generally SAX ETAL., supra
note 1, at 287-89.
4. Act ofJuly 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218.
5. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377. See SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at
306.
6. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21
(1994)).
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government began, in earnest, to reserve large tracts of federal land
from disposition, and concomitantly began to reassert some control
over western water resources. In its 1899 Rio Grande decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court made clear that the federal government had the right,
"as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to [command] the
continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the
beneficial uses of the government property."7 Less than a decade later,
the Supreme Court developed this idea into a black letter principle of
federal law. In the famous Winters case, it held that when the United
States reserved land for national purposes-in that case, for an Indian
reservation-and was silent on water, it also implicitly reserved enough
available water (i.e., which had not already been spoken for under
federal or state law) to carry out those purposes.
Twenty-seven years after Winters, the pendulum swung back. In its
1935 CaliforniaOregon Power decision,9 the Court interpreted the 1866,
1870, and 1877 statutes as "severing" water from land in the West, at
least for purposes of private appropriation. While the Court's opinion
did not address Winters (though it did discuss Rio Grande), its emphasis
on the "public interest in... state control in the arid-land states" left
an impression that the Court was not going to expansively interpret
the "implied-federal-reserved-water-rights" doctrine.
Another generation, another swing of the pendulum. In 1955, in
its so-called Pelton Dam decision, the Court strongly hinted that federal
reservations of land outside the Indian context also carry Winters'
rights with them, by holding that California Oregon Powers severance
doctrine did not apply to reserved federal lands. In 1963, the Court
confirmed this result, almost as an afterthought, in the landmark
decision Arizona v. California."
The application of the Winters principle to reservations of federal
land for other than non-Indian purposes troubled the states, who
already didn't think much of Winters in the Indian context. By the
time the Court decided Arizona v. California, the national government
had set aside upwards of two hundred million acres of federal land as
national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and other protected categories.
Almost none of these reservations specifically mentioned water, but
Arizona v. Californiaseemed to say all of them silently reserved water.
Perhaps reflecting the quickening population and economic
growth in the West, the next pendulum swin took less than a
generation. In the 1976 Devil's Hole pupfish case, the Court signaled
a limit as to how far it would go to find a water right implied from
silence. The decision itself dramatically asserted federal supremacy,
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
Id. at 165.
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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because the Court applied federal law to shut down groundwater
pumping authorized under state law on private land in order to
protect an underground pool found on federal land more than two
miles away. The pool was included in a national monument President
Truman established in 1952, under the Antiquities Act of 1906 , in
order to protect the habitat of a rare fish. But the Court seemed to go
out of its way to say that President Truman had expressly, not
impliedly, reserved water in the proclamation. And then it said,
ominously for pro-federal interests, that water reserved by the
"implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine" was "only that amount of
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. " "
Cappaertlaid the groundwork for the New Mexico decision two years
later.'
There the Court handed federal land managers a major
setback by finding that water had not been implicitly reserved for
wildlife, recreation or other such uses when Congress established the
Gila National Forest in New Mexico at the end of the previous century.
Instead, the reservation was only for the primary purposes of timber
supply and "favorable [conditions of] water flows" (whatever the latter
might mean), but not for "secondary use [s]" of the reservation, like
wildlife and recreation. This distinction between principal purposes
and secondary uses appeared for the first time in this case-seventy
years after Winters.
POST-NEW MEXnCO DEVELOPMENTS
In the twenty-three years since New Mexico, the century-old practice
of setting aside federal land for various conservation purposes has
continued apace. Congress has done it in numerous statutes, and the
Executive-especially Presidents Carter and Clinton-has done it by
exercising authority delegated by Congress under the Antiquities Act.
In these more recent actions, a rather remarkable, but mostly
unremarked-upon, thing has happened. As explained further below,
most of these acts have specifically addressed water rights. The trend
is moving away from the traditional approach of silences--that is, not
expressly saying whether water was or was not reserved. The trend line
is not unbroken; Congress enacted legislation last year establishing
national conservation areas east of Tucson and north of Reno, a
national monument near Palm Springs, and protections for the Steens
Mountain in Oregon, all of which were silent on whether water was

14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
15. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 141.
16. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
17. Id. at 700, 702, 716.
18. What I call silence includes situations where Congress (or the Executive) says
something about water, but what it says is not very meaningful. Typical of these
disclaimers is the one found in the Wilderness Act: "Nothing in this [act] shall
constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government
as to exemption from State water laws." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6) (1994) (emphasis
added).
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reserved. 9
This brings up another remarkable, and also mostly unremarkedWhile the federal government now often
upon, development.
explicitly addresses water, there is no consistent pattern in what it has
said. For example, 1984 and 1990 legislation designating federal lands
in Arizona as wilderness, 1987 legislation establishing a national
monument, national conservation area, and wilderness on federal land
in New Mexico, 1988 legislation establishing national park wilderness
in the state of Washington and a national riparian conservation area in
Arizona, 1990 legislation establishing national conservation areas in
Nevada and Arizona, and 1994 legislation establishing conservation
units in the California Desert, all explicitly reserved water for these
By contrast, 1988 legislation
purposes as a matter of federal law.
and 2000 legislation
in
Idaho
monuments
establishing national
and
a wilderness area in
establishing a national conservation area
Colorado expressly disclaimed any reservation of water under federal
law.2 ' There is also the occasional oddball provision that does
neither.2
Those crafting legislation often find that silence is a convenient
way to paper over differences on a difficult or controversial aspect of
the proposal under consideration. But in the context of new federal
land conservation legislation, silence on water is now sometimes
resisted so much that, if the pertinent interest groups cannot come to
agreement about how water will be addressed, the result may be no
legislation at all. For instance, a stalemate over whether Congress
would reserve water held up Colorado wilderness legislation for nearly
The impasse broke in 1992-93 only after intensive
a decade.

19. Las Cienegas National Conservation Area Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-538, 114
Stat. 2563 (Arizona); Black Rock Desert-High Rock Canyon Emigrant Trails National
Conservation Area Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Nevada); Santa
Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains National Monument Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106351, 114 Stat. 1362 (California); Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-399, 114 Stat. 1655 (Oregon).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-49 (1994) (El Malpais National Monument and
Conservation Area, New Mexico); 16 U.S.C. § 460xx-1 (d) (1994) (San Pedro Riparian
National Conservation Area, Arizona); 16 U.S.C. § 460ccc-8 (1994) (Red Rock Canyon
National Conservation Area, Nevada); 16 U.S.C. § 460ddd(f) (Gila Box Riparian
National Conservation Area, Arizona); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 812-13.
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 460yy-1(f) (1994) (City of Rocks National Reserve, Idaho);
Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-353, § 6 (1)(2), 114 Stat. 1374, 1378.
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 46011-3(d) (1994), which provided that nothing in the 1980
legislation establishing the Rattlesnake National Recreation Area in Montana "shall be
construed to permit the [federal land managing agency] to affect or diminish any
water right which is vested under either State or Federal law on October 19, 1980," nor
affect access by the owner of any such water right to operate and maintain any water
facilities. See also 16 U.S.C. § 460iii-5(d) (1994) (Snake River Birds of Prey National
Conservation Area, Idaho) (no need for additional reservation of water because
United States already claiming prior water rights for conservation purposes in ongoing
general stream adjudication); 16 U.S.C. § 543c(b) (1994) (Mono Basin National
Forest Scenic Area, California) (area to be managed consistent with protection of
established water rights).
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negotiations produced agreement that, while the legislation would
expressly not reserve water, it would contain an elaborately defined
alternative way to protect the water resources of the high altitude
wilderness areas-through controls on access by the federal land
manager. 23
The Carter and Clinton Administrations also generally opted
against silence when they exercised executive authority to reserve
federal land for conservation purposes. President Carter's seventeen
Alaska national monuments (covering fifty-six million acres of federal
land) expressly reserved water.2 4 Almost all of President Clinton's
nearly two dozen national monument proclamations addressed water,
though not in a uniform way. Water was expressly reserved to carry
out the gurposes of the Agua Fria National Monument north of
Phoenix, the Cascade Siskiyou in southern Oregon, 6 the Sequoia in
California, 7 and the enlargement of the Pinnacles National
Monument in California.2 ' A reservation of water was expressly
disclaimed in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument,2 the
Grand

Canyon-Parashant,30

Vermilion

Cliffs, 3 1

Canyons

of the

Sonoran Desert," and in the
Ironwood
Ancients,
enlargement of the Craters of the Moon.3" The Missouri Breaks and
2

Forest,33

23. See Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-77, §8, 107 Stat. 756, 76263; SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 813-14. Specifically authorizing control of access to
federal lands to protect water avoids the controversy that sometimes accompanies
federal land managers using their ordinary authority over access to the same end. See
Janet C. Neuman & Michael C. Blumm, Waterfor NationalForests: the Bypass Flow Report
and the Great Divide in Western Water Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1999).
24. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 57,035, 57,036 (Dec. 5, 1978) (Denali National
Monument) ("There is also reserved all water necessary to the proper care and
management of those objects protected by this monument and for the proper
administration of the monument in accordance with applicable laws.").
25. Proclamation No. 7263, 65 Fed. Reg. 2817, 2818 (Jan. 11, 2000) (Agua Fria
National Monument).
26. Proclamation No. 7318, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,249, 37,250 (June 13, 2000) (CascadeSiskiyou National Monument).
27. Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,095, 24,098 (Apr. 25, 2000) (Giant
Sequoia National Monument).
28. Proclamation No. 7266, 65 Fed. Reg. 2831, 2832 (Jan. 18, 2000) (Boundary
Enlargement of the Pinnacles National Monument).
29. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (Sept. 24, 1996)
(Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
30. Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825, 2828 (Jan. 18, 2000) (Establishment
of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument).
31. Proclamation No. 7374, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,227, 69,229 (Nov. 15, 2000) (Vermilion
Cliffs National Monument).
32. Proclamation No. 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,243, 37,245 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Canyons of the Ancients National Monument).
33. Proclamation No. 7320, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,259, 37,260 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Ironwood Forest National Monument).
34. Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg. 7354, 7356 (Jan. 22, 2001) (Establishment
of the Sonoran Desert National Monument).
35. Proclamation No. 7373, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,221, 69,223 (Nov. 15, 2000) (Boundary
Enlargement of the Craters of the Moon National Monument). These proclamations
(notes 29-35) typically instructed the federal land manager to cooperate with state
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Hanford Reach proclamations took a middle course: in Missouri
Breaks, water was expressly reserved only in two tributaries with
outstanding cottonwood gallery forests; 6 and at Hanford, water was
expressly reserved only in the main stem of the Columbia, but not in
tributaries. 7
In each case, the President accepted Secretary Babbitt's
recommendation regarding water, which was based on the Secretary's
judgment about whether a reservation of water was necessary to
protect the monument's purposes. As one deeply involved in this
process, I can attest that we looked at what the monument's needs for
water were; whether the necessary water resources were already
protected by other, previous federal reservations; and whether any
additional protection that might be advisable could be afforded other
ways (such as through land access controls). We also assessed the risk
that new water rights might be perfected under state law outside the
monument that could interfere with monument purposes.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH SILENCE?

The trend away from silence in the last twenty years has been a sea
change, a departure from well over a century of traditional practice. It
is worth pausing to explore why this has happened. One reason is that
conservation opponents have seized upon this issue as a useful way to
resist conservation designations. Many traditional water developers
and their allies believe a demand that water be addressed will mean
either that water won't be reserved, or better yet (in the eyes of some),
conservation designations won't be made at all.
But there is more to it than this. Opponents of silence also make a
more principled argument, that silence simply leaves too much
uncertain. There may exist a wide gulf between what the federal
government claims as a water right from silence under the impliedreservation-of-water doctrine, and what other interests, claiming rights
Until a binding
under state law, are willing to acknowledge.
adjudication occurs, no one knows whether, or how much, water is
being reserved. The uncertainty may continue for decades. While the
McCarran Amendmente gives the states first crack at figuring out what
silence means (if they want to go to the trouble of conducting general
stream adjudications), a long time may pass before litigation is
instituted, and even longer before it is brought to the point of
decision." Almost eighty years went by before the U.S. Supreme Court
water authorities to secure needed water rights.
36. Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg. 7359, 7361 (Jan. 22, 2001) (Establishment
of the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument).
37. Proclamation No. 7319, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,253, 37,255 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Hanford Reach National Monument).
38. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994); seeSAXETAL., supranote 1, at 815-29.
39. Note, however, that this is not so much of a problem with new land reservations
in Colorado because of Colorado's unique system of continuous or rolling
adjudications of water rights, including those based on federal law. See, e.g., United
States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-23 (1971).
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interpreted the silence of an 1899 forest reservation in United States v.
New Mexico'0 Thirty-six years elapsed before the Idaho Supreme Court
decided what a 1964 wilderness designation meant for water rights.'
Moreover, punting to the courts to decide the matter at some
future time is playing a form of roulette with the outcome, given the
historical shifts of the Supreme Court on the subject recounted earlier.
It is difficult to predict how the courts will decide, or when they will
decide, what silence means in the numerous federal reservations. The
decision depends, at least in part, on when and in what form the issue
is taken to the courts, and who is sitting on the bench.
It is also worth noting that even when Congress or the Executive
expressly reserves water, neither typically identifies a specific amount.
While the fact that Congress reserves water for specified purposes is no
longer open to dispute in such legislation, the amount of water
necessary to carry out the purposes may be vigorously disputed.
Adjudication is necessary to settle the matter. Therefore, even an
express reservation of water leaves important issues open, perhaps for
a long time.
Opponents of federal reservations of water usually put forward
arguments against silence in new federal reservations. However, the
uncertainty created by silence (or left even by an express but
unquantified reservation of water, as pointed out in the preceding
paragraph) is potentially harmful to federal interests as well. The
United States usually lacks sufficient incentive to identify and quantify
its claims until it is compelled to do so when joined in a state general
stream adjudication. In the meantime, uncertainty may lead the
federal land managing agency not to act vigilantly in protecting its
inchoate federal water right claims against encroachment by later
appropriators. This can make the assertion and defense of federal
water rights harder, in a practical and political if not a legal sense,
when an adjudication of those rights is finally at hand. Furthermore, if
the courts eventually decide that silence in a particular reservation
does not reserve water for some federal purposes, the federal
government will at that point have lost potentially valuable years of
priority, if it then takes what may be the only practicable course left:
file an application to appropriate the needed water under state law.
(The practice of the United States has been not to file under state law
for water that it believes it has already reserved under the reserved
rights doctrine, for fear that filing for the former will undermine its
claim to the latter once the matter goes to adjudication.) Assuming
the United States could have appropriated water under New Mexico
law for wildlife or recreational flows when Congress created the Gila
40. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
41. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000). The Idaho
Supreme Court provided another example earlier this year when, in a questionable
decision, it determined that a 1937 reservation of the Deer Flat Migratory Waterfowl
Refuge on some islands in the Snake River did not implicitly reserve water to maintain
the character of the islands as a refuge from predators. United States v. State, 2001
WL 170644 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2001).
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National Forest in 1899,42 the fact that the Supreme Court took
seventy-nine years to decide, in United States v. New Mexico, that the
reservation did not include an implied federal reserved water right for
these purposes was costly. The difference of priority might well
determine whether water is available to be appropriated to serve the
federal purposes.
Although I have suggested reasons why silence can threaten all
sides, the problems silence causes may be larger in theory than in fact.
It is true that nearly all the major land reservation systems in the
west-national forests, national parks, etc.-were created without
specifically addressing water. And it is also true that many of the
implied federal reserved water rights that may attach to these
hundreds of millions of acres of federal land have not yet been finally,
definitively settled. Yet this uncertainty has had no demonstrable
negative impact on economic activity in the region. By almost every
conventional measure-such as population and economic growththe West has plainly thrived for many decades amidst uncertainty over
the scope of federal claims to water. Whether silence has had a
negative effect on the federal government's ability to secure water for
conservation purposes is more difficult to assess.4" The U.S. Forest
Service will have a more difficult time securing recreational and
environmental flows for national forests because of how the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted silence in the New Mexico case, and
securing wilderness flows because of how the Idaho Supreme Court
interpreted silence in the recent Idaho case. But whether federal
programs will be thwarted as a result is harder to say. It is possible,
then, that silence has not proved crippling. But the uncertainty
silence breeds is at least annoying, and at worst has the potential to
adversely affect both federal and state water interests.
Although opinions may differ on whether silence ought to remain
acceptable, the political reality is that those with power to make new
designations in the executive and legislative branches generally believe
silence is unacceptable. This reality alone makes silence less likely in
the making of new federal land conservation designations than it was a
generation ago. The effect may be to postpone the land conservation
actions, or to go ahead with the designation but expressly not reserve
water. The latter leaves the United States wholly dependent on state
law and, as I will explain in a moment, at the mercy of state forces, who
lack a structural check against the tendency to act hostile to federal
interests.
Nevertheless, as noted above, some new federal land conservation
legislation has remained silent on water. This move away from silence

42. Admittedly, this a dubious assumption because even today New Mexico law
sharply limits instream flow appropriations, if indeed it allows them at all. See SAX ET
AL., supra note 1, at 114-15.
43. Probably silence has had a negative impact on securing water for Indians, but
that question is beyond my compass here. Cf Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983).
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leaves an interesting question: when Congress enacts some land
conservation bills that expressly disclaim any reservation of water, and
others that expressly reserve water, what does a bill that is silent on the
subject mean to say about the matter? Can one draw an inference that
silence means water is reserved, or that it is not reserved, or is silence
merely neutral? The answer is not clear, but it is entirely possible that
a court not very moved by claims on behalf of the environment, which
is a fair characterization of the current Supreme Court, will find
silence today means no federal reservation of water. This suggests, in
turn, that environmental advocates, who want to maximize federal
reservations of water for environmental purposes, face an increasingly
uphill fight in convincing the courts that silence now means-as it
once did, in the era of the Winters-thatwater is reserved as a matter of
federal law."'
This puts pro-conservation interests on the horns of a dilemma.
On the one hand, pro-conservationists may accept silence now only to
see, twenty or fifty years from now, the courts decide that today's
silence does not reserve water. This would mean, as pointed out above,
that the federal government will have lost twenty or fifty years of
priority if it then files under state law to appropriate the water it needs.
In the worst case, no more unappropriated water may exist. On the
other hand, environmental interests may oppose an otherwise proconservation designation because they decide they can't accept silence
on water or, worse, an express decision not to reserve water as a matter
of federal law. In such a situation, if silence or an express disclaimer
that no water is reserved is the only way to secure enough political
support to take the action, the result would be that the proconservation designation does not go forward. Where this dilemma
exists, in other words, environmentalists must decide whether they
should (a) support pro-conservation actions without assurance that
water will be protected as a matter of federal law; or instead (b) accept
a delay in achieving protection, and hope that the national
government will eventually find a way to protect whatever water is then
available for the federal purposes as a matter of federal (or possibly
state) law.
STATE VERSUS FEDERAL INTERESTS

At this point, it may be useful to take a step back, to examine the
broader question of what federal and state interests are really at stake
in this debate. This will prepare the ground for exploring whether
there is an approach that might, at least in some circumstances, better
reconcile those interests. The states have a sovereign interest in
having their laws control water rights administration as much as
44. Pro-reservation advocates are not without arguments. For example, they can
focus more on the necessity of water to the reservation purpose rather than any
implied intent to reserve. They can also argue that legislative silence simply reflected a
determination to leave the matter to the courts, rather than being a congressional
decision not to reserve water.
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possible. They also perceive an economic interest in controlling water
through state law. This economic interest exists partly because, in my
experience at least, the states tend to favor traditional uses of water for
what might be called commodity purposes-agricultural irrigation and
municipal and industrial uses. Finally, the states also have a general
interest in securing notice of federal as well as other water claims, and
certainty about what those claims are. On its side, the federal
government has a general interest in securing water (including, where
appropriate, perfecting property rights in water) to meet the needs of
federal programs, especially environmentally related programs, as
easily and cheaply as possible.
States'-righters argue that complete deference to state water law
systems will work just fine to meet federal needs. Both history and
political science suggest the contrary, however. Powerful forces pull
states away from responding to federal needs, even when
unappropriated water is available. As a broad generalization, state
water administration systems in the West tend to be at least somewhat
captive of traditional interests; that is, no long and strong tradition of
independent-mindedness exists among state water bureaucracies.
Moreover, some state substantive laws simply do not adequately
recognize water rights (e.g., instream flows, or rights that protect
surface water from groundwater diversions) that may be necessary to
protect federal interests, and they may not permit federal agencies to
hold such rights.45 While state governing bodies (including state
courts) have generally become more progressive on water issues in the
last couple of decades, they still have a considerable distance to travel
before one can depend on them to recognize, let alone safeguard, the
needs of federal land conservation systems wholly through state law.4"
States may never get there, for they have powerful internal
incentives to let parochial, anti-federal interests win out. In addition
to the backlash against the Idaho Supreme Court decision described
above, this was illustrated in 1995 when both Arizona and Nevada
amended their state laws in response to ranching interests. Both states
prohibited the federal Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), and
Arizona additionally prohibited the U.S. Forest Service, from applying
for water rights for livestock grazing on federal lands. These new laws
applied only to the federal agencies, and not to state land
management agencies. They altered, only for federal lands, the
traditional rule in both states that allowed the landowner, not the
livestock owner, to hold the water rights associated with livestock
45. See, e.g., Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private
Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVrL. L. 203 (1997).
46. For a thoughtful general review of the disappointing efforts to reform state
water policy in the 1990s, see David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water
Policy: Have FederalLaws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role? 20 STAN. ENvrL. L.J.
3, 71 (2001) ("Although the reasons for reform persist and are better understood than
ever, existing state legal and institutional frameworks endure virtually unchanged.
Vocal interests with expectations or vested rights rooted in old policies typically resist
proposals to... dedicate more water to instream uses.").
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grazing. 7 While the issue was not on its face a dispute over
environmental conservation, in reality it was: the livestock interests in
the states wanted water rights associated with public land livestock
grazing exclusively in their own names, not in the names of
government agencies. The purpose was both symbolic and practicalto make it harder for the federal agencies to restrict or reduce
livestock grazing on public lands for environmental protection or
restoration purposes.
Livestock graziers compose a tiny part of each state's economy.
Nearly all other water interests in each state are indifferent to the
matter. Yet regarding this issue, the state legislatures easily adopted
laws that blatantly discriminated against federal land managers. This
behavior neatly illustrates the ineluctable fact that, while state interests
are well represented in the operations of the national government, the
contrary is not so true. When the states are found in the arid West
and the subject matter is water, the difficulty state governments have in
accounting for federal government interests is even more pronounced.
These facts do not lead to the conclusion that the federal
government should seek to minimize involvement with state water
rights systems, even if it had that luxury (which it does not). On the
contrary, the federal government's long-term interest is to work
through and help build up the quality of state water rights
administration. This goal recognizes several enduring realities. First,
state systems are the primary force in the field-there is not, and likely
never will be, a general federal water law or water rights administrative
system that parallels that of the states.
Second, the McCarran
Amendment, which basically gives the states the option to adjudicate
and administer federal reserved water rights in state systems along with
their own state law water rights, is very unlikely to be repealed in the
foreseeable future. Third, federal reserved water rights have never
been, and will never be, the only way the federal government secures
water needed for federal purposes. The Bureau of Reclamation and
the Bureau of Land Management are primarily dependent on state law
to meet the water needs of their programs. Even federal agencies like
the U.S. Forest Service (particularly after New Mexico) and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service also rely on state law for at least some of their
water needs."
For all these reasons, the more competent, professional, and
impartial the state systems are, the better for the federal government.
But simply improving the quality of state systems cannot solve the
structural problem-the built-in temptation to favor local interests

47. See SAX ETAL., supra note 1, at 871-72.
48. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (1998); Mitchell v. United States,
41 Fed. Cl. 617 (1998); Store Safe Redlands Assocs. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726
(1996).

49. Cf Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the NationalGovernment, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
50. See SAX ETAL., supra note 1, at 866-72.
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over federal ones. This situation sugVests the need to retain a
The need for a federal
counterbalancing dose of federal law.
counterweight is particularly true in making new federal conservation
designations, for this is where state water law may be the weakest
compared to what would obtain under the federal reserved rights
doctrine. It is rather difficult to imagine, for example, that a state
agency or court would have applied state law to reach the same result
the Supreme Court reached in the Devil's Hole pupfish case-to find a
water right to protect an obscure fish of no commercial value (albeit of
significant scientific interest) when such protection required shutting
down a farmer's wellfield.52
A THIRD WAY
Which brings me, finally, to the question of whether there might
be another way, when Congress considers new federal land
conservation programs, to integrate associated federal water needs
with state water law systems. At least in some circumstances, the
answer may be yes. Legislation recently adopted regarding the Great
Sand Dunes in Colorado, legislation strongly supported by most of
Colorado's congressional delegation and the Clinton Administration,
is worth examining. 53 Its approach did not conform to the traditional
dichotomy between state water rights and federal reserved water rights.
It holds some promise for breaking out of that box in a way that
accommodates both federal and state interests.
Proposals to export water from the San Luis Valley to Colorado's
burgeoning Front Range had created controversy in recent years.
Last year, export opponents joined forces with conservationists who
wanted to see the Great Sand Dunes National Monument55 expanded
yet again6 to encompass all of the natural features now understood,
given advances in scientific knowledge, as necessary for the
preservation of the Dunes ecosystem. (Those natural features, not
incidentally, include surface and groundwater resources upon which

51. Professor Getches persuasively explains how many of the more progressive
reforms in state water management in the last decade have come about because of
federal pressure. See Getches, supra note 46, at 42-59.
52. In Cappaert, the National Park Service asked the Nevada State Engineer either
to deny or delay a decision on Cappaert's application to install a welifield until the
completion of a Park Service commissioned hydrologic study to assess the proposed
wellfield's impact on the national monument and the pupfish habitat. The State
Engineer brushed the request aside, finding the grasses and grains Cappaert wanted to
grow with well water better served the public interest than doing the study. See
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1976).
53. Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530,
114 Stat. 2527.
54. See, e.g., Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994).
55. President Hoover first created the Great Sand Dunes National Monument in
1932. SeeAct of Mar. 17, 1932, 47 Stat. 2506.
56. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower expanded the Great Sand Dunes National
Monument in 1946 and 1956, respectively. SeeAct of Mar. 12, 1946, 60 Stat. 1339; Act
ofJune 7, 1956, 70 Stat. c31.
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the Dunes depend.) Others who thought tourism would be promoted
if the Great Sand Dunes were made a full-fledged national park joined
these two interests. Secretary Babbitt and the Clinton Administration
quickly endorsed the idea.
The question was how to handle the water issue in the designation
process. Secretary Babbitt strongly supported an express reservation in
the legislation of a traditional federal reserved water right for the
expanded conservation area, defined to include the surface and
groundwater resources that were necessary to protect the Dunes. The
congressional delegation and local interests opposed a federal
reserved right, largely on ideological and political grounds, because
they did not want to be seen as promoting a full-scale takeover of the
area's water resources. They argued for letting state water law control
all aspects of the situation.
Our response, on behalf of the Interior Department, was that we
didn't think state law was adequate to protect the federal interests, in
two key respects. First, to the extent an instream flow water right
would be required, state law would not allow the National Park Service
to hold the right in its name. Only a state agency (the Colorado Water
Conservation Board) could hold the right.5 7 This was unacceptable-if
this was to be a national park, the water right necessary for its
protection ought to be held in the name of, and controlled and
enforceable by, the National Park Service. Second, we were concerned
about how much substantive legal protection a Colorado state water
right actually afforded to the surface and groundwater resources upon
which the Dunes ecosystem depends.
While the initial discussions revealed a wide gap on the mechanism
for getting there, clearly everyone shared the goal of expanding the
federal land reservation, and securing adequate protection for its vital
water resources. This agreement on the goal, and some flexibility on
both sides, led in the end to an unusual and adroit marriage of state
and federal law. The legislation Congress adopted last fall authorizes
the federal government to secure a water right that will be
appropriated, not reserved, through the processes of state law and in
accordance with the priority system of state law. But, the right will be
defined according to federal law-namely, whatever unappropriated
surface and ground water is shown necessary for protection of the
Dunes ecosystem-and the right will be held in the name of the Park
Service.58 It is a new breed of federal water right-a federal non-reserved

57. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2000).
58. The legislation's key section, 9(b)(2)(B), says the Secretary of the Interior is
"specifically authorized to appropriate water under this Act exclusively for the
purposes of maintaining ground water levels, surface water levels, and stream flows on,
across, and under the national park and national preserve, in order to accomplish the
purposes of the national park and the national preserve and to protect park resources
and park uses." Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-530, § 9(b) (2) (B), 114 Stat. 2527, 2533-34. That this substantive standard of
federal law preempts any inconsistent state law is made clear by an earlier part of
section 9(b) (2) (A), which says the water rights obtained and exercised by the
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right.
To water lawyers with memories that go back twenty-two years,
those are very loaded words. I know, because I helped load them. As
Associate Solicitor for Energy and Resources in the Carter
Administration's Interior Department, I helped craft the infamous
"Krulitz Opinion"59 (named after Solicitor Leo Krulitz), which boldly
announced that the federal government could claim a right to use
water under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19760
The
("FLPMA") without following the substance of state law.
reasoning was straightforward: FLPMA laid out a series of new
management objectives for the BLM-managed public lands. Many of
those objectives, such as wildlife habitat and ecosystem protection and
some forms of recreation, required water, but the laws of many western
states where public lands were located did not then acknowledge that
water rights could be secured for such uses. Therefore, Solicitor
Krulitz opined, if unappropriated water was available, the BLM could
acquire a right to it using the procedures of state law, in accordance
with the priority system of state law, but without conforming to the
substance of state law. Instead, federal law-specifically, FLPMAwould define the substance of the right.
The opinion created a firestorm of protest that led the western
governors to rise up en masse and persuade one of their former
colleagues, then-Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, to cease and
desist. Within a year, Solicitor Krulitz had left and his successor,
seasoned Colorado water lawyer and former professor Clyde Martz,
rethought the matter. Martz issued a supplement to the Krulitz
opinion saying Krulitz had it right in theory-there could be occasions
where federal law could trump the substance of state water law where
necessary to carry out federal programs-but wrong in application,
because FLPMA did not contemplate that result.6 Krulitz had misread
the statute, Martz said, in finding within it an intent to override state
substantive water law.
There were more twists in the path to come. When the Reagan
Administration took office, its Solicitor, William Coldiron, issued his
own supplement to Martz's supplement to Krulitz's opinion. Coldiron
said Krulitz and Martz were both wrong. Coldiron wrote that Congress
could not-as a constitutional matter-ignore state substantive water
law other than through a federal reserved water right.62 The federal
"non-reserved" right, in other words, simply could not exist.
Finally, the Department of Justice weighed in, through Theodore
Secretary "to fulfill the purposes of the national park and the national preserve...
shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed, and administered pursuant to the
proceduralrequirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado." Id. §
9(b) (2)(A), 114 Stat. at 2533 (emphasis added).
59. See 86 Interior Decision 553, 614-618 (1979); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at
872-73.
60. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
61. 88 Interior Decision 253 (1981).
62. 88 Interior Decision 1055, 1064-65 (1981).
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Olson, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel." Olson's opinion,"
issued in 1982, is the modern equivalent of an Attorney General's
opinion, the highest legal authority in the executive branch. Olson
very gently chided Coldiron, 61 saying he as well as Krulitz had got it
wrong, and Martz was right. Congress has the constitutional power to
create a non-reserved federal water right if its legislation made clear
that's what it was doing (so Coldiron's suggestion to the contrary was
wrong). But Congress had not done so in FLPMA (so on that point
Krulitz was wrong and Martz was right).6 Olson's opinion is the last
word on the subject; not having been disturbed since, it still expresses
executive branch policy. Moreover, it seems clearly right on the issue
of constitutional power, at least to this observer.
Nearly twenty years later, the Sand Dunes legislation gives Olson's
view concrete realization. This legislation contains what may be the
nation's first clear-cut example of a federal non-reserved water right,
and a possible roadmap for how Congress might handle water issues in
future federal land conservation designations.
CONCLUSION

The Great Sand Dunes approach directly addresses most of the
concerns that have arisen about the traditional way of handling water
issues in new federal land conservation designations. It offers some
distinct advantages over the alternatives of silence, an express federal
reserved right, or total deference to state law. National interests are
protected because the federal government holds an enforceable water
right in its own name, and federal, not state law measures the
substance of the right. This means the standard by which the right is
quantified and adjudicated is one of federal law which, like the
quantification and adjudication of a traditional federal reserved right,
63. Theodore Olson is known more recently for his work for President George W.
Bush concerning the Florida election litigation. In late May 2001, the U.S. Senate
confirmed Olson as Solicitor General of the United States.
64. Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328 (1982).
65. Olson crafted his opinion to provide maximum comfort to the state water
interests in the West while preserving federal supremacy. The opinion's opening
paragraph sweepingly announces that the "federal non-reserved water rights theory
which we address in this opinion does not provide an appropriate legal basis for
assertion of water rights by federal agencies in the western states," id. at 329, but the
bulk of the opinion carefully and persuasively explains its conclusion that Congress
has "ample power" to supersede state water law in particular cases without asserting a
federal reserved water right. Id. at 383. Similarly, while Olson's opinion criticizes the
Krulitz Opinion at length, it never directly rebukes Solicitor Coldiron's opinion,
although its conclusion is plainly at odds with Coldiron's. Compare id, at 361 with id. at
374-83.
66. See, e.g., id. at 357, 361-62, 383.
67. I addressed the background of the Great Sand Dunes legislation and how its
water rights provisions should be implemented in somewhat more detail in a legal
opinion I signed, and in which Secretary Babbitt concurred, on January 18, 2001.
Memorandum from the Office of the Solicitor, to the Director of the National Park
Service (Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of Denver, College of Law, Water
Law Review).
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is ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.6
State interests are protected because the federal agency has to file
for the right and, thus, the right may be adjudicated and administered
in the state water administration system, and in accordance with the
state priority system. Both sides are served by the fact that the
uncertainty over the contours of the right may be resolved relatively
promptly, without the need to wait decades for a general stream
adjudication. And, more subtly, both sides are served because this
approach compels them to cooperate more closely, which may foster
better communications between, and more confidence in, each other.
This is not to say that questions won't arise about the contours of
the Great Sand Dunes water right as Congress implements the statute.
Gray areas will inevitably emerge when one tries to distinguish between
process (governed by state law) and substance (governed by federal
law). But problems of this kind exist today, when federal reserved
rights are adjudicated and administered in state systems under the
McCarran Amendment.69
All told, where proposed new federal land conservation
designations are stalemated by a concern over what to say or not to say
about water rights, the Great Sand Dunes approach may offer a way to
break the impasse that accommodates the legitimate interests of both
the federal and state governments." It deserves a serious look.

68. See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
69. See, e.g., SAXETAL., supra note 1, at 825-29.
70. One might well ask, if this is such a good approach, why didn't the Clinton
Administration take it in designating new national monuments? As noted in the text
accompanying notes 24-37 supra, most of the recent national monuments specifically
addressed water, but none took the non-reserved right approach. For one thing, we
thought the idea would be controversial, given its relative novelty, and its association
We were
with the Krulitz/Martz/Coldiron opinions of a generation earlier.
concerned that a controversy could undermine the larger land conservation objectives
at stake in the monument designation process. It is also not completely clear that
Congress had given the President the authority in the Antiquities Act to create a nonreserved right-to appropriate water through a state water right system but under
federal substantive law. Although the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") rejected
Solicitor Coldiron's view (see supra text accompanying note 62) that Congress could
not give the Executive this power (see supra text accompanying notes 63-66), OLC left
open the question whether, in individual statutes, Congress has done so. Perhaps,
then, the Antiquities Act fails to give the Executive such authority, even though it
seems ironic to argue that, while the Act implicitly gave the President authority to
reserve water under the Winters doctrine (see supra text accompanying notes 13-15
(Cappaert discussion)), it did not at the same time implicitly authorize the Executive to
preempt state water law in a considerably more limited way. The bottom line for the
Administration was that the issues were too subtle, and the context too sensitive, to
embark on a new approach as part of the national monuments initiative. While we
thought the approach had merit, we believed it preferable to work through a test case,
as it were, in bipartisan discussions with Congress in the context of the Sand Dunes
legislation.
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